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OBLIGATIONS
H. Alston Johnson III*
RECOVERY OF NON-PECUNIARY DAMAGES
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

In an opinion published at the very beginning of the term under
review in this symposium, the Louisiana Supreme Court severely limited
the right to recover non-pecuniary damages for breach of contract.
Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc. I was a proceeding brought by a
daughter and her father for damages suffered due to the breach of a
contract to repair her automobile. The repair took seven months, and the
trial court awarded her reimbursement for her seven car notes and seven
insurance premiums paid during this period. It also awarded her $700.00
in damages for "aggravation, distress, and inconvenience."
On appeal, the reimbursement awards were affirmed and eventually
that judgment became final. However, the court of appeal held that the
award for aggravation, distress and inconvenience could not be permitted,
and reversed that portion of the judgment. 2 Granting a writ on this issue
alone, the supreme court agreed that the contract had been breached but
concluded that the award for these non-pecuniary damages was inappropriate and thus affirmed the appellate court's judgment.
The supreme court detected an error in the translation of article
1934(3) and felt that the article, properly translated, required that it not
permit the award of such damages. The preceding paragraphs of the article
contain the general rule that the damages awardable for breach of a
contract consist of the amount of the loss the creditor has sustained, or of
the gain of which he has been deprived. The third paragraph of the article,
noting that this is the general rule, nonetheless provides that "there are
cases in which damages may be assessed without calculating altogether on
the pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary gain ....
" It then
describes these cases:
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976).
2. 322 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
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Where the contract has for its object the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or taste, or some
convenience or other legal gratification, although these are not appreciated in money by the parties, yet damages are due for their
breach . .. .

The error, unfortunately for plaintiffs, apparently impaired one of the
primary bases for their argument that the damages should be awarded.
Properly translated, that portion of the article should read:
Where the contract has for its object to confer to someone a purely
intellectual enjoyment, such as those pertaining to religion, morality,
taste, convenience or to all other sorts of satisfaction of this type,

although these things are not appreciated in money by the parties,
damages will nonetheless be due for violation of the agreement. 4
Plaintiffs had argued that if a contract had for its object either "intellectual enjoyment" or "convenience," non-pecuniary damages could be
awarded. The corrected translation convinced the court that "convenience" was only an example, and that non-pecuniary damages could not be
awarded when the contract did not have for at least one of its principal
objects some "intellectual enjoyment."
Distinguishing several earlier supreme court cases, 5 and failing to
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934(3).
4. The court's own translation is somewhat incomplete, though the incompleteness may not have been thought to be significant. The court translates the
phrase "i toute autre espece de satisfactionde ce genre" as "other gratifications of
this sort," when it should more properly be translated as "all other sorts of
satisfaction of this type."
5. The three cases specifically distinguished were Jiles v. Venus Community
Center Benevolent Mut. Aid Assoc., 191 La. 803, 186 So. 342 (1939); O'Meallie v.
Moreau, 116 La. 1020, 41 So. 243 (1906); Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66
(1903). It was said that the court had never adopted a firm policy on the question of
non-pecuniary damages but had "reached results favoring" a broader interpretation
of article 1934(3). 332 So. 2d at 435. Lewis is perhaps the best known of these
decisions, concerning an award to a bride for her disappointment and humiliation
due to the breach by the defendants of a contract to prepare certain dresses for the
bride's trousseau. In affirming the award, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not find
that both physical and intellectual enjoyment were objects of the contract. It simply
held that the breach of the contract caused disappointment and humiliation, quoted

article 1934(3) and permitted the recovery. But the Meador majority opinion
characterizes the case as one involving a contract with both physical and intellectual
enjoyment as objects.
O'Meallie is a very interesting decision, written in the inimitable style of Mr.
Justice Provosty. It involved the breach of a contract to reserve the use of a facility
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mention several appellate decisions, including two of its own, 6 the supreme court held that where "an object, or the exclusive object, of a
contract, is physical gratification (or anything other than intellectual
gratification) nonpecuniary damages as a consequence of nonfulfillment of
that object are not recoverable." 7 And, per contra, "where a principal or
exclusive object of a contract is intellectual enjoyment, nonpecuniary
damages resulting from the nonfulfillment of that intellectual object are
8
recoverable."
It seemed to matter to the court that plaintiffs' case was one "sounding in contract," and it noted that damages of the type it was now
disapproving would be approved in a case "sounding in tort." Mr. Justice
Dixon, dissenting, wondered why this made any difference since in each
case, there was a duty on the part of the defendant and the duty was
breached; and since Louisiana employs fact pleading. 9 With all deference
to the majority, there appears to be a considerable amount of merit in his
quandary.
"Contract" and "tort" are labels which we give to causes of action
to enforce an obligation which it is alleged the defendant had toward the
plaintiff. In our Civil Code, an obligation may arise from a conventional
agreement between the parties, or as a result of a delictual act by one of
for a social club. In fact, much to the chagrin of the plaintiffs' social club, it had
been reserved for a rival social club through error. It is difficult to see how one can
conclude after reading the opinion that the contract had any "intellectual enjoyment" as a part of the object of the agreement. In fact, the phrase is never
mentioned in the opinion. Yet the Meador opinion states that the contract had both
physical and intellectual objects. In Jiles, again without reference to "intellectual
enjoyment," damages for mental anguish were awarded to the parents of a child
who was not seen by a physician due to the breach of a contract which the parents
had with an association to provide such a physician.
6. Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, Inc., 207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d 189 (1945) (damages
for humiliation and embarrassment suffered by plaintiff, a cripple, when he was
denied admission to a theatre, after having purchased a ticket); Graham v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903) (mental anguish for defendant's
failure to deliver promptly to plaintiff's wife a telegram informing her of the serious
illness and impending death of her son); Mitchell v. Shreveport Laundries, Inc., 61
So. 2d 539 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952) (award for mental anguish when defendant failed
to return plaintiff's suit which he intended to wear to a wedding; plaintiff was of
unusual size and was forced to wear an old and soiled suit). See also Grather v.
Tipery Studios, Inc., 334 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) (award for mental
anguish for breach of contract to provide suitable wedding pictures).
7. 332 So. 2d at 437.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 439 (Dixon, J., dissenting).
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them toward the other, or from certain other sources. ° Whatever the
source, the obligation is synonymous with a duty which the obligor has
toward the obligee. II If the source is a convention between the two parties,
that convention takes the place of law between them, and must be performed in good faith. 12 If it is not, damages are awardable for the breach. 13
With this point the majority opinion in Meador would be in agreement. But the court felt that it could not, in the face of the language of
article 1934(3) quoted earlier, award non-pecuniary damages unless "intellectual enjoyment" appeared as a principal or the exclusive object of the
contract.
For once, we cannot blame this peculiarity of our law on the French.
There is no similar provision in the Code Napol6on. After some early
authority to the contrary, the French have for a number of years permitted
what they term "moral damages" for breach of contract. i4 It is of course
noted by French authorities that such awards might be less frequent than in
cases involving delictual obligations, but that there is no reason in princi15
ple to deny such damages.
The only reason why Louisiana apparently is not supposed to have
the same rule is the reference in article 1934(3) to "intellectual enjoyment" as an object of the agreement. But it is as plausible to see this as
merely a reference to non-business agreements, as it is to see it as
establishing some limitation on the types of damage which may be awarded. The fact that many articles in this section give examples by referring to
commercial or business agreements suggests that the redactors considered
that these rules would be, for the most part, applied to business agreements. 16 The general rule of measuring damages given at the beginning of
article 1934 is one of a business nature: the loss sustained, or the gain of
10.
11.
12.
13.

LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1760, 2292.
Id. art. 1756.
Id. art. 1901.
Id. arts. 1803, 1930.

14. 8
FRANCAIS

C. BEUDANT & P. LEREBOURS PIGEONNIERE, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL
603 (2d ed. 1934); A. WEILL & F. TERRIE, DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS,

391 et seq. (1975).

Some of the types of cases in which such awards have been made

are noted in JURIS CLASSEUR CIVIL, arts. 1146-1155, fasc. 25-A: for breach of a

contract to sell kosher meats; for defective functioning of some equipment; and for
breach of a contract to restore certain family portraits.
15. 8 C. BEUDANT & P. LEREBOURS PIGEONNIERE, supra note 14, at 603.

16. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1806, 1807, 1816, 1817, 1833, 1843, 1844, 1847(4),
1915 & 1916.
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which the party was deprived. In a business agreement, such damage is
fairly susceptible of pecuniary measurement.
But lest it be thought that only those damages susceptible of
pecuniary measurement be considered cognizable by the law, the redactors
added a paragraph making it clear that even when there was no way to

measure the damage in pecuniary terms, some award could still be made,
the amount being left to the "much discretion" of the fact finder. 7 It is
significant that the phrase used describes contracts intended to confer
"purely intellectual enjoyment." This may have meant only that
completely non-business agreements might nonetheless be considered
appropriate for the judicial machinery, with damages measured by the
discretion of the judge or jury. It will be recalled that a proper translation
of the phrase "purely intellectual enjoyment" includes the mentioned
examples as well as "all other sorts of satisfaction of this type. 1 8 This is
hardly limiting language; rather, it is consistent with an effort to describe
non-business agreements to assure that a proper scope of protection would
be afforded to them as well.
The argument here is not that the language of article 1934(3) is clear
and requires the above conclusion. Rather, it is susceptible of at least two
interpretations.' 9 The one given it by the supreme court in Meador is
somewhat narrow, and has no other support in the Civil Code but that one
statement in article 1934(3). The other, granting to the person to whom the
obligation was owed the possibility of reparation for whatever harm he
20
may have suffered, is supportable in other articles of the Civil Code.
17. Id. art. 1934(3) states in part: "In the assessment of damages under this
rule, as well as in cases of offenses, quasi offenses, and quasi contracts, much
discretion must be left to the judge or jury, while in other cases they have
none . . . ." Read in context, this appears to support the argument that the
redactors were simply trying to point out that some flexibility in measuring damage
should be recognized in considering breaches of those obligations which, when
breached, would give rise to no readily ascertainable loss or deprivation of gain.
Damages in the case of a delictual obligation which has been breached, for example,
could hardly be ascertained by applying the rule mentioned at the beginning of
article 1934; "much discretion" must be given to the jury or judge to determine
what will "repair" the harm under article 2315 of the Civil Code.
18. See note 4, supra.
19. Three different interpretations are suggested in Comment, Damages Ex
Contractu: Recovery of Non-Pecuniary Damages for Breach of Contract Under
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1934, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1160 (1974).
20. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1930, 2315. The latter article, for example, simply
provides that the "damages to another" be "repaired" by the person whose
"fault" produced the damage. The majority opinion correctly notes that nonpecuniary damages have been awarded under the authority of that article. But its

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

Moreover, it is much more in keeping with the Louisiana approach of
pleading facts rather than theories of recovery. How sensible is it to say,
for example, that a bus company must respond for mental distress proved
to have been suffered by another driver due to the negligence of its bus
driver in causing a collision, but not for the same distress proved to have
been suffered by one of its passengers, because the former action "sounds
in tort" and the latter "sounds in contract"? Those phrases simply are not
in the Civil Code, and the whole fabric of the Code indicates that they are
alien to its approach to obligations.
It would probably have been better to base the decision on article
1930 of the Civil Code, which provides:
The obligations of contract [contracts] extending to whatsoever
is incident to such contracts, the party who violates them, is liable, as
one of the incidents of his obligations, to the payment of the damages, which the other party has sustained by his default. 2'
The rule of article 1934, supplementing this general principle, simply
provides that the general rule of measuring these damages is by determining the amount of loss suffered, or gain of which the party was deprived.
Sometimes even this general rule of measurement of damage cannot be
applied, since some contracts are non-business agreements to which this
rule would simply be irrelevant. In those cases, article 1934(3) approves
an award of damages, measured simply by the "much discretion" of the
judge or jury. It states that the damages "may be assessed" without
calculating in any way on the pecuniary loss or privation of pecuniary
gain.22 This is "measurement" language, not language limiting damages
to only certain types.
statement about reparation is just as general as that contained in article 1930: the
party who violates the agreement "is liable, as one of the incidents of his obligations, to the payment of the damages, which the other party has sustained by his
default."
21. This article has no counterpart in the Code Napoleon.
22. There is also an error in the translation of this portion of the article from the
French text of the Code of 1825. The French text provided, in pertinent part, "il est
des cas oil des dommages peuvent etre accord6s, sans les calculer en aucune
maniire sur ]a perte pdcuniaire, ou la privation du gain que la partie peut avoir
6prouv6e." This was translated as "yet there are cases in which damages may be
assessed without calculating altogether on the pecuniary loss, or the privation of
pecuniary gain to the party." It should better have been rendered as "yet there are
cases in which damages may be assessed without calculating in any way on the
pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary gain to the party." This is probably
insignificant, but it would be more proper to state the article in the latter fashion.
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Viewed in this light, article 1934(3) is not a prohibition against
awarding non-pecuniary losses for a breach of the ordinary contract. It is
simply a provision that when one cannot measure the loss in pecuniary
terms, such as in a contract for "purely" intellectual enjoyment, one may
measure the loss according to the discretion of the trier of fact. Article
1930 authorizes "damages" generally; article 1934(3) provides guidelines
for measuring them, but does not contradict the general authorization of
article 1930.

It is not likely that a great many parties to contracts will suffer mental
distress because of their breach, and a court should properly be wary of a
party who says that he has suffered such distress. But if he has, and can

demonstrate that he has, article 1934(3) should not be interpreted to deny
him that recovery.

23

23. The supreme court almost had a chance to reconsider its decision in
Meador in a case involving a substantially larger amount of damage. In Ward v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 539 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1976), a jury award of some
$500,000 was affirmed, to plaintiffs who claimed that the excess liability judgment
rendered against them as defendants in another action was due to the defendant
insurer's arbitrary failure to settle the case within the policy limits ($10,000). An
additional award to the plaintiffs (husband and wife) of some $650,000 for mental
anguish, humiliation and embarrassment was viewed by the Fifth Circuit as an
award of non-pecuniary damages for the breach of the insurance contract. Noting
the Meador decision as well as others, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it should
certify the question of the availability of such damages in a breach of contract
action to the Louisiana Supreme Court, pursuant to LA. R.S. 13:72.1 (Supp. 1972)
and Rule XII of the Louisiana Supreme Court. However, the case was settled
before the Louisiana Supreme Court could express itself on the question.

